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This research analyze the practice of irrigation, education, and free trade governance linked 
with functional decentralization concept in Indonesia’s decentralization policy frame. This re-
search use constructivist approach and qualitative-descriptive method. Research result find sev-
eral factors that cause functional decentralization in Indonesia’s decentralization policy for ir-
rigation, education, and free trade is not adopted. Political institution is not adopted, independ-
ence of the farmers, integration of river and irrigation web, and state constitution, are the fac-
tors from irrigation side. Several factors in education are the existence of educational boards, 
the independence of school, devolution in education governance, and state constitution. For 
free trade, the institution of Batam governance, members structure in Batam’s boards, the un-
certainty of BP. Batam in Indonesia’s administration structure, and state constitution, which 
make functional decentralization is not adopted. Generally, state constitution is major factor of 
functional decentralization is not adopted. The Construction of Decentralization in the Future 
of Indonesia’s Decentralization Policy especially in irrigation, education, and free trade can be 
done gradually begin from inter-local government cooperation, state-local collaboration in 
boards until establishing the functional decentralization’s organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decentralization Policy in Indonesia 
which has been implementation since the 
country attained independence is not free of 
problems. The problems relate to the level of 
decentralization, division of responsibilities, 
relations between the central and local gov-
ernments, social conflicts that have affected 
local governments, disputes among local 
governments that are still rife and are at-
tributable to many factors, including the im-
plementation of responsibilities and authori-
ty.   With respect to the administering free 
trade for example, Batam authority which 
was established during President Suharto’s 
era as a free trade zone and was envisioned 
to rival Singapore as one of the growth 
points in the national economy (hinterland) 
and was an outcome of the formation of free 
trade zones and harbors in Indonesia today. 
To that end,   an evaluation of the policy of 
Batam free zone can serve as a basis that can 
inform policies on the implementation of 
free trade zones and harbors in other regions 
in Indonesia in future.  Batan city admin-
istration, which was formed on the basis of 
Law No.  5/1974, is characterized by a high-
ly centralized regulatory framework. Such a 
regulatory framework ensured easier control 
of the city administration by the central gov-
ernment in Jakarta. Besides, Batam authority 
has an institutional framework that is ambig-
uous, managed under ambiguous mecha-
nisms as whether it falls under centralized, 
de-concentrated or  central government re-
sponsibility that is delegated to  the city gov-
ernment authority (Maksum, 2016).  
With respect to legal framework that 
underpins Batam management agency (BP-
Batam), there is a problem of power and au-
thority between (BP-Batam), the former Ba-
tam authority and Batam city administration.  
Law No. 36 / 2000 as amended by Presiden-
tial decision No.44 / 2007 on the rights to 
manage land that is vested to Batam authori-
ty and that conferred on Batam city admin-
istration. The law vested land that fell under 
the control of Batam free trade zone and har-
bor to Batam management agency.  The im-
plication of the change was that BP was the 
only institution that had authority over the 
control and management of land.   Nonethe-
less, such a status contravenes Law No. 
32/2004 on local governments.  The contra-
vention lies in the fact that the  Law 
No.36/2000 vests upon Batam city admin-
istration far more powers and authority than 
is allowed under Law No.32/2004 on local 
governments (Murti, 2014). Consequently, 
such a legal condition, has created coordina-
tion problems both vertically and horizontal-
ly (Muzwardi, 2015). 
The management of  Shenzhen free 
trade zone in China, which initially bor-
rowed a lesson or two from  Batam,  was 
based on legal framework that established 
Shenzhen FTZ as a  stakeholder based spe-
cial area in the region  with its own area of 
operations through administrative reforms 
that were implemented in 1998 as part and 
parcel of the Open door policy (Xu, n.d.) 
(Tantri, 2013) (Lan, 2010). 
Nonetheless, problems of institutional 
ambiguity in the decentralization policy in 
Indonesia are not only limited to the man-
agement of free trade zones, but are also 
very evident in irrigation policy.  Since at-
taining independence, irrigation has been a 
crucially important issue in the establish-
ment of regional autonomy in Indonesia. 
Maksum quotes  Hoessein who notes that  
irrigation issue lies at the root of the for-
mation of several  autonomous regions in 
Indonesia in accordance with Law No. 22 / 
1948  that entailed four details for Province; 
3 activity details  medebewind for large cit-
ies and districts;  and 2 detailed activities 
medebewind for municipalies (Maksum, 
2006). However, the root cause of the prob-
lem in irrigation arose during reformation 
era with the implementation of Law No.  
22 / 1999, which replaced Law No.   5/1974.  
Despite the fact that irrigation is based on 
terrain, Law No. 5 / 1974 vested the authori-
ty and power over the management of irriga-
tion to provincial governments, and such a 
status continues to run smoothly.  Nonethe-
less, things changed dramatically with the 
implementation of Law No. 22 / 1999 when 
the authority and power to manage irrigation 
was devolved to district/city governments.  
The root cause of the problem that Maksum 
alludes to relates to the over enthusiasm of 
regional autonomy  and de-concentration 
that is stipulated in Law No. 22 / 1999 which 
adopts weak local  irrigation institutions as 
traditional institutions.  This is because local 
irrigation institutions, despite being govern-
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ment institutions, are merely charged with 
implementing programs and activities, but 
do not have the authority and power to make 
and issue policies. Besides, local govern-
ments were thrown into confusion by the 
decision which was issued by the constitu-
tional court of republic of Indonesia.  The 
Constitutional court issued a decision No.  
85/PUU-XI/2013, which in effect restored 
the authority to manage and administer irri-
gation  to the provincial level in accordance 
with  Law No. 11 / 1974 on irrigation that 
was in turn amended by Law No. 7 / 2004 on 
water resources.  To that end, local govern-
ments were in confusion due to the fact that 
while decentralization and democracy 
opened way for decentralization of many 
affairs and responsibilities from the central 
government to local governments, the con-
stitutional court restored centralized man-
agement of irrigation resources at the prov-
ince level. Confusion became evident in the 
case of Bandar Lampung city irrigation man-
agement that was based on Law No. 7 / 
2004, which was line with the decentraliza-
tion spirit,  but was in fact in contravention 
of Law No. 11/ 1974 as mandated by the  
constitution court decision  on  the manage-
ment of irrigation, which henceforth  re-
stored the authority  to the provincial gov-
ernment (Hamidah, 2015). The above prob-
lems in irrigation are attributable to the fact 
that the management of irrigation continues 
to be based on territorial (area) approach, 
rather than the function of water in line with 
the flow of the river.  To overcome the 
above problems, regulation and management 
or irrigation should be under a stakeholder 
special institution or agency at the province 
level,  and not administered at the city /
district level (Kuks, 2002). 
Nonetheless, problems that have come 
in the wake of decentralization are not lim-
ited to irrigation and free trade issues but are 
also evident in the regulatory framework on 
education provision. The regulation of edu-
cation policy is based on the devolution of 
authority to manage, administer and funding   
from the central government to local govern-
ments.  Consequently, a problem that has 
emerged is the inability of local govern-
ments to implement the decentralization of 
education due to the lack of capacity to do 
so. This is moreover, not to  mention major 
changes that have affected  schools, central 
government and local governments, and  so-
ciety in general (Pasandaran, 2004). In any 
case, inability of city/district governments to 
live to their  political commitments with re-
gards to the allocation of at least 20 percent 
of annual regional government  expenditure 
on education every year  is as a result of the 
limited  local government revenue   capacity  
(Kuswandi, 2011). 
To that end, the existence of problems 
in the free trade zone, irrigation administra-
tion, and education delivery, highlight the 
fact that decentralization policy in Indonesia 
has some shortcomings.  The constitution 
stipulates on territorial decentralization with-
out regulating functional decentralization. 
This is problematic as decentralization is not 
only limited to territorial or administrative 
region, but also functions that are conducted 
within the decentralized region  (Hung, 
2009). Functional decentralization is the de-
volution of authority to regulate and admin-
ister certain functions that are delimited by 
the type of function. Functional decentraliza-
tion can also be defined as the relinquishing 
of power /authority to regulate and adminis-
ter certain or some interests  (Hoessein, 
1993).  The Anglo Saxon dictionary defines 
functional decentralization as a  special pur-
pose authorities which is elucidated by  
Humes (Humes, 1959)  as  The Special-
purpose authority is distinguished from the 
special purpose de-concentrated agencies of 
the central government bureaucratic hierar-
chy by the fact that it is outside this adminis-
trative hierarchy and has a representative 
governing organ, whose members may be 
selected in one or more following ways. 
The above type of decentralization de-
mands that certain interests are administered 
by certain groups.  Nonetheless, concurrent 
implementation of territorial and functional 
decentralization is possible in any country. 
Functional decentralization is not possible 
without regional or territorial decentraliza-
tion, as the former creates a special  adminis-
trative system  that is autonomous  at the lo-
cal level while the latter an autonomous lo-
cal government (Maksum, 2007). 
In fact, functional decentralization pol-
icy is not an entirely new concept in the 
realm of public management in Indonesia.  
The Dutch East Indian Company regime es-
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tablished     waterschappen agency in Indo-
nesia, a measure that was regulated and in-
corporated into the Dutch Indian Company 
at the time.  The body presaged the for-
mation of Dharma Tirta in Central Java 
(Maksum, 2006). The existence of the agen-
cy was ensured by incorporating it into the 
Indonesian constitution after the country at-
tained its Independence. Nonetheless, regu-
lation of such institutions as Tirta Dharma 
from being initiators of policies to imple-
menters by the government is liable to create 
policy related problems if the role they play 
transcends nature and functions for which 
they were established in the first place as 
enjoined in the decentralization process.  To 
that end, based on a snapshot of the prob-
lems that have characterized  decentraliza-
tion policy a conclusion can be drawn that 
the policy as has been implemented in Indo-
nesia that have been described  as lame due 
to the fact that it has not been effected in the 
realm of functions.  The shortcoming is evi-
dent in problems that have arose in the con-
duct and administration of various affairs or 
responsibilities which require the use of 
functional decentralization instruments.  
Problems in the management of irrigation, 
free trade zone, and education administration 
that have been described above will never be 
resolved as long as management is still lim-
ited to regional decentralization.   The above 
conclusion is the overarching motivation of 
this paper that has the objective of develop-
ing a functional decentralization construct in 
Indonesia. 
This study is the first policy research 
on decentralization policy in Indonesia. 
Based on the background and title, this study 
focuses on developing a construct for func-
tional decentralization in Indonesia.  Moreo-
ver, in light of the background,  the research 
problem for this research problems for this 
study are formulated  into the following re-
search questions 1) why has  the  decentrali-
zation of irrigation, free trade zone, and edu-
cation sector have not adopted functional 
decentralization in Indonesia?  2) What 
should be the construct of decentralization 
management in irrigation, free trade zone, 
and education sector administration in Indo-
nesia in future?  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
To tackle the high complexity of exist-
ing perspectives and understanding of the 
meaning of functional decentralization in 
areas of irrigation, free trade, and education, 
this research uses a constructivism approach.   
The approach facilitates a more comprehen-
sive and extensive search for meaning than 
would be possible if categorization were 
used.  To that end, the object of this research 
is the decentralization system in Indonesia, 
with (BP Batam), Batam city government, 
Ministry of education and culture, being the 
locus of the research.  Meanwhile, units of 
analysis for this research included the educa-
tion office, South Jakarta,  State High school 
28, South Jakarta,  Ciliwung-Cisadane agen-
cy (BBWS Cilicis), Ministry of public works  
and People’s housing, local government 
agency for Ciliwun River basin management 
(BP DAS Ciliwung)  and  Directorate Gen-
eral  for regional autonomy (Ditjen Otda), 
Directorate  General for regional administra-
tion,  Directorate  General for  regional de-
velopment administration (Ditjen Bina 
Bangda) Ministry of internal affairs . 
In order to use a constructivism ap-
proach to analyze functional decentraliza-
tion, which one of the important components 
of this research, the research uses analytical 
framework that is based on level.  The level 
of analysis is used in social sciences to iden-
tify and determine differences in scale, loca-
tion, and size of the object that is the focus 
of the research. Bocong Li cites  Enderle 
who contends that micro as individuals, me-
so as organizations, and macro as institutions 
(Li, 2012). In light of that, this research used 
a micro level analysis of education, irriga-
tion, and trade, while at the meso level, the 
research compared management practices in 
education, irrigation, and trade in Indonesia 
with other countries that have adopted func-
tional decentralization in the three areas.  
Macro level analysis, tackles government 
policy on education, irrigation and trade and 
how the bearing thereof on existing theory.    
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Factors that influence the prevent the 
adoption functional decentralization in 
the Decentralization policy in Indonesia in 
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Irrigation, education and free trade sec-
tors 
a. Irrigation administration  
Decentralization of irrigation admin-
istration in Indonesia is underpinned by 
the need for ensure local government ac-
countability.  If irrigation is located in a 
city/district administration, it becomes the 
responsibility of the respective city and 
district administration. Meanwhile, irriga-
tion services that runs across city/district 
administrations, becomes the responsibil-
ity of the provincial government. Based 
on research findings, several factors were 
identified as responsible for the absence 
of functional decentralization in the con-
duct of tertiary secondary even primary 
irrigation services. The factors are pre-
sented and discussed in the following sec-
tion.  
Non accommodation of political institu-
tions  
Ministerial regulation PUPR No. 17 / 
2015 on the irrigation commission. The 
functions and responsibilities of the irri-
gation commission are stipulated in arti-
cle 3 to 14, by dividing irrigation com-
mission in accordance with the area of 
irrigation.  Thus, there is an inter province 
irrigation commission, provincial irriga-
tion commission,   and city/district irriga-
tion commission.  Thus, if irrigation ad-
ministration is juxtaposed with the loca-
tion of farmers’ groups and irrigation net-
works, it is evident that the management 
of irrigation is still based on area or re-
gion. It has been noted in an earlier sec-
tion that authority to manage irrigation is 
vested with city/district governments, 
while river basins run across several city/
district administrations, managing con-
flicts between farmers and local govern-
ments across city/district administration 
unavoidable. On the other hand, the legal 
framework on irrigation commission does 
not give the irrigation commission the 
authority to resolve any potential conflicts 
that may arise.  In the event of conflicts,   
the government establishes a forum that is 
known as coordination team for river ba-
sin water resources management (). 
Meanwhile, Minister of public works 
regulation No. 4 / 2008 on guidelines for 
TKPSDA stipulates mechanisms for the 
formation of area based forums right from 
the city/district government to those that 
link provinces.   In general, the forums 
which are established on the basis of deci-
sions that are issued by local government 
heads and the Minister, are charged with 
providing coordination services. Mean-
while,   regulation of membership of fo-
rums becomes the responsibility of parties 
that are relevant and responsible for irri-
gation and river basin management.  The 
representative institution, which today 
continues to serve as the forum that 
brings various relevant stakeholders, 
merely serves coordinating and communi-
cation roles hence does not have the au-
thority to make policy decisions on irriga-
tion issues.  Nonetheless, in the new regu-
lation, the irrigation commission is 
charged with the task of providing assis-
tance to local government heads (in ac-
cordance with the administration level of 
the commission) in formulating activity 
plans, recommendations, and inputs in 
relevant policies. To that end, the repre-
sentative body can be regarded as an 
agency that is formed by and accountable 
to, the local government head, besides, a 
political institution can be regarded as 
representative is it owes its existence to 
the public who conferred upon them the 
authority to represent and ventilate their 
aspirations. Such representation occurs if 
a large section of the public is involved in 
conferring the authority.  This is contrary 
to conditions on the ground as an official 
in the Ministry of public works and peo-
ple’s housing acknowledged.  An expert 
in the Ministry of public works and peo-
ple’s housing acknowledged that the 
number of members of farmers’ groups 
on forums that are charged with tertiary 
irrigation management does not go be-
yond 30 persons.  The existence of farm-
ers’ groups instills and cultivates confi-
dence, trust and ability among farmers to 
work together to achieve certain objec-
tives, which would not be possible if they 
were working individually.  To that end, 
farmers’ groups are credited for creating 
mutual trust  (Sidik, 2015) as cited from  
Putnam  in what he refers to as social cap-
ital. 
Alma’arif and Irfan Ridwan Maksum — Functional Decentralization Construct in Decentralization Policy…. 
60 
 
Copyright © 2017, JKAP, ISSN  0852-9213 (Print), ISSN 2477-4693 (Online)   
Today, farmers /farmers’ groups, 
which are involved in primary and sec-
ondary irrigation management are volun-
teering their services to help local govern-
ments.  If authority that is vested in farm-
ers’ groups which are involved in tertiary 
irrigation management is elevated at least 
to secondary irrigation management level, 
will increase the likelihood of forming a 
representative institution.  This is attribut-
able to the fact that the number of farmers 
is ever rising.  However, based on obser-
vations that were made by a certain ex-
pert… “If the authority on managing sec-
ondary irrigation is increased, difficulties 
farmers will face will increase as well. 
The problem lies in the fact that second-
ary irrigation by its nature is very tech-
nical and is capital intensive, both of 
which capabilities farmers are very want-
ing”.  Moreover, according to   BBWS 
Cilicis sources, farmers cannot finance 
the technical construction of irrigation 
channels simply because the amount they 
collect from subscriptions for using irri-
gation water is not enough to pay for the 
cost of developing irrigation channels.  
Farmers’ Independence  
P3A executes management of tertiary 
irrigation by forming an organization, 
which consists of members and adminis-
trators.  The  Ministry of Internal affairs 
regulation  No. 50 / 2001 does not contain 
detailed provisions on the structure that  
P3A management should take ,  but states 
its appointment must be determined by a 
members’ meeting.  If the general struc-
ture that organizations can serve as an 
example, management of the organization 
comprises a head, a deputy head, secre-
tary, and treasurer, all of whom are elect-
ed by P3A members in a meeting. None-
theless, the structure of tertiary irrigation 
administration is somewhat different from 
the general form. This is based on infor-
mation the researcher obtained from an 
interview with    BBWS Cilicis officials 
who noted that while the structure of the 
organization consists of management and 
members, a new structure in addition has 
a water master.  The following excerpt of 
the interview elucidates the complete sto-
ry: 
 
“…The local government is charged 
with regulating water in the context of 
opening and closing the water gates, a 
task that rests with the water master 
(mantra) who acts in consultation with 
farmers…P3A or GP3A selects individ-
uals who are charged with regulating 
water, while the water master, who is 
an employee of the office of agriculture 
is charged with training farmers on wa-
ter usage as well as serving as facilita-
tor/serves as coordinator or linkage  
between P3A and GP3A on one hand 
and the office of agriculture on the oth-
er.  The water master is a resident of 
the village, but is a representative of the 
office of agriculture who does not earn 
a salary for his duties.” 
 
The excerpt of the interview above 
gives one the picture that in addition to  
managers /administrators who are elected 
by members,  farmers groups also have 
representatives of city/district govern-
ments who are charged with the task of 
providing training on water usage to farm-
ers  as well as serve as a communication 
bridge  between farmers and the city/
district agriculture office. Besides, there is 
also a BBWS Cilicis irrigation work unit 
that is responsible for regulating and con-
trolling water usage through water gates.  
The excerpt of the interview with farmers 
is presented below: 
 
“…if there are direct complaints from 
farmers about the amount of water that 
their farms receive, there are water 
gates control personnel to tackle that 
problem.  Thus, usually farmers convey 
such complaints directly to water gate 
control personnel.” 
  
However, on closer observation, it is 
evident that the form of coordination and 
relations between P3A and other organiza-
tions in regulating and controlling irriga-
tion in agriculture reveals some obstacles 
that may hamper the performance of P3A.  
The relations between P3A and the water 
master, P3A and agricultural extension 
service personnel for irrigation, P3A and 
city/district public works office and P3A 
and city/district agricultural office.  The 
heavy dependency of P3A on other organ-
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izations has the potential to become a 
source of bribery.   In a research on irriga-
tion dynamics, Maksum discovered that 
subscriptions for tertiary irrigation water 
has spawned rent seeking activity among 
the bureaucracy (Maksum, 2006).  In 
some Dharma Tirta locations where mobi-
lizing irrigation water subscription has 
proved difficult to realize, access to water 
has become a matter of “who needs irriga-
tion water is the one who must pay those 
who have control over the water”.  Balles-
teros corroborates the above situation by 
the existence of a relationship between 
functional decentralization and transparen-
cy in public service delivery.  The higher 
the degree of functional decentralization , 
the higher the level of transparency in the 
delivery of public services    (Cuadrado-
Ballesteros, 2014)(Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 
García-Sánchez, Prado-Lorenzo, & García
-Sanchez, 2016). 
Subscriptions from P3A members is 
only one of the sources of P3A income 
that is recognized by the government.  
Funds from P3A, GP3A, and  IP3A 
sources as regulated in Ministry of home 
affairs regulation No.50 / 2001 can be ob-
tained or sourced from  (1)  subscriptions 
irrigation management; (2) Non-binding 
contributions or assistance; (3)  other legal 
economic activities; (4) assistance from 
the central and local government;  and  (5) 
Assistance from foreign  foundations/
institutions. The structure of financing  
P3A through member subscriptions is 
based on the  waterschappen pattern  in 
the Netherland which  according to Kuks’ 
elucidation  (Kuks, 2002) notes: 
 
  “…water boards in other hand, cannot 
rely on such subsidies, and have to fully re-
cover the costs of their activities by their own 
taxation. Water boards have a democratic 
structure, based on a profit-payment-
participation principle (those having an inter-
est in water management may participate and 
have to pay for water service in proportion to 
their interest.” 
 
Besides, specifically with respect to 
irrigation and water, the local government 
faces the difficulty of making a decision 
that affects many stakeholders with varied 
interests.  In a detailed account,  Sellin 
(Selin, 2011) asserts that: 
 
“In the specific case of water, questions 
about responsiveness and intergovernmental 
coordination are critical as water governance 
becomes increasingly localized. Communities 
throughout the nation are facing serious and 
escalating challenges in securing an adequate 
water supply and protecting the quality of 
their drinking water. Local governments will 
face difficult decisions as they attempt to bal-
ance competing demands from different user 
groups and manage the externalities from 
their policy choices.”  
River and irrigation network integra-
tion  
The river Ciliwung Cisadane (Cilicis) 
catchment area that covers three 3 prov-
inces and 10 city/districts makes the issue 
river management the responsibility of the 
central government. Meanwhile,   with 
regards to irrigation management,   water 
dams that are located in the upstream sec-
tion of the rivers and primary and second-
ary irrigation are to a certain extent the 
responsibility of the central government.  
Meanwhile, secondary and tertiary irriga-
tion of certain areal sizes, constitute the 
responsibility of the provincial, and city/
district governments. This was acknowl-
edged by the expert who was one of the 
concepts of the Law of local governments 
who noted that regulatory framework irri-
gation and river is starkly different. More 
precisely, he emphasized that  
 
“Almost all irrigation networks rarely run 
from one regional autonomy government to 
another. Even where that is the case, there is 
clear demarcation and division in the irriga-
tion system for the two contiguous local gov-
ernments.   That explains why distribution of 
irrigation system cannot run from one region-
al autonomy government to another.   In fact 
irrigation area constitutes farm land.  Thus, 
irrigation water comes from water dam rather 
than from the river, even in areas that are lo-
cated upstream.  Meanwhile, management of a 
river basin is based on accountability.” 
 
If irrigation management of river basin 
was considered from the vantage point of 
special area, an irrigation system that 
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crosses city/districts and provinces should 
be designated special region. This is very 
much in line with the argument which an 
expert who was one of the key informants 
in this study made to the effect that: 
 
“…Ciliwung-Cisadane irrigation 
area can be designated a special region, 
in not, disasters such as the flash floods 
that emanated from the leakage of water 
from Gintung in Banten are unavoida-
ble in the future. This is because it the 
central government that has the authori-
ty but does not control and regulate de-
velopment in surrounding areas such as 
was the case in Situ Gintung.  Conse-
quently, the local government issued 
building permits that led to the improp-
er development of the surrounding are-
as that eventually precipitated the disas-
ter.  Once the disaster occurred, no par-
ty was ready to assume responsibility.” 
   
On the contrary, another informant 
who is an official in the Ministry of Inter-
nal affairs had views that were in contrast 
to those of the above informant.  He im-
plicitly noted that: 
 
“…actually designating a spe-
cial region is regulated in articles 360 
and 361, Law No. 23 / 2014 on local 
governments. The articles stipulate spe-
cial zones or areas as defined by two 
articles in the law. “ 
 
In relation to the above statement 
which the informant from the Ministry of 
Internal affairs made, it appears that an 
irrigation area does not meet the require-
ments that are stipulated in Law 
No.23/2014 on local governments.  Be-
sides, the informant from the Ministry of 
Internal affairs made additional remarks 
to the effect that: 
 
“The authority to manage irriga-
tion was exhaustively divided among the 
central government, provincial, city/
district governments.  Yes. Irrigation 
that occurs in more than one province, 
falls under the management of the cen-
tral government, while that between 
city/district administrations, becomes 
the responsibility of the province, and 
irrigation that occurs within one city/
district administration falls under the 
management of the city/district admin-
istration. To that end, the division of 
authority to management irrigation is 
very clear, as is stated in the attachment 
to the law. 
…to make things clearer, there is 
a mechanism that foster cooperation 
across local governments as well as on 
issues that relate to formulating govern-
ment regulations on local government 
authority within the ambit of a special 
region or zone. “ 
 
Based on the excerpt of the interview 
above, the inference that can be drawn is 
that officials in the Ministry of Internal 
affairs espouse the view that managing 
irrigation issues can be done through the 
mechanism of local government coopera-
tion. Moreover, the excerpt of the inter-
view does not indicate that the govern-
ment, as represented by views of the Min-
istry of internal affairs, vested more pow-
er and authority (empowered) local gov-
ernments to effectively manage special 
regions or areas without empowering the 
local government population.   
Besides, based on the acknowledge-
ment of officials from the Ministry of In-
ternal affairs and Ministry of public works 
and people’s housing, cooperation among 
local governments and sharing of authori-
ty and power on the basis of the principle 
of accountability is only ideal if the irriga-
tion administration is in line with river 
basin.  To that an understanding of the au-
thority and power vested in the local gov-
ernment autonomy is essential for devel-
oping functional decentralization in Indo-
nesia that is not based on clear concepts 
and does not take into account constraints 
of local governments in managing certain 
issues and affairs cross local government 
jurisdiction. Humes (Humes, 1959) 
acknowledges that the concept of a special 
district that was developed and adopted in 
United States of America was motivated 
by limitations that autonomous regions 
faced in executing their functions. 
b. Education administration 
An important pillar in promoting qual-
ity education in local governments is not 
only the responsibility of the central gov-
ernment and local governments, but also 
JKAP (Jurnal Kebijakan dan Administrasi Publik) Vol.21 (1), May 2017 ---- https://journal.ugm.ac.id/jkap 
63 
 
Copyright © 2017, JKAP, ISSN  0852-9213 (Print), ISSN 2477-4693 (Online)   
 that of the populace.  . Decentralization of 
education provision offers local govern-
ments and schools the opportunity to 
make the best decisions with respect to the 
conduct of education in accordance with 
the potential of the area and stakeholders.  
Some of the factors that are responsible 
for the non-incorporation of functional 
decentralization in education delivery in 
Indonesia, are presented in the following 
section.  
Existence of the Education council  
The function of the education council 
is to foster improvement in the quality of 
education delivery by providing inputs, 
direction and manpower support, infra-
structure and facilities, and supervision of 
the conduct of education, at the national, 
provincial, and city /district levels.  In ad-
dition, the above activities and responsi-
bilities of the education council are com-
plemented by the tasks of collecting, ana-
lyzing, and giving recommendations to the 
Minister, governors, district heads, and 
mayors, in response to public complaints, 
advice, and aspirations that relate to edu-
cation delivery. 
According to government regulation 
No. 17 / 2010, the authority to establish 
the education council is vested in the head 
of the local government and the Minister 
of education. Meanwhile, membership of 
the council comprises 1) education ex-
perts; 2) practitioners of education; 3) 
businessmen; 4) professional organiza-
tions; 5)   Religion or socio-culture based 
specialist education; 6) international edu-
cation; 7) local competitiveness based ed-
ucation; and 8) social organizations.  It is 
evident that the structure of membership 
of the council of education consists of rep-
resentatives that are drawn from a cross 
section of interests. 
In practice, however, the education 
council does not play as important a role 
as envisaged. This is an acknowledgement 
that was made by one of the key inform-
ants for this study, who is an official in the 
center for strategic policy in the Ministry 
of Education and culture. The excerpt of 
the interview is presented in the following 
section: 
“…the education council is not 
specifically oriented toward one school, 
but is based on territory such as the 
national education council, provincial 
education council, and city/district edu-
cation council, making it less effective.  
I know that because during my tenure 
as the secretary, it was me who was 
responsible for selecting membership. 
This was because at the time, the legal 
framework was not supported by a deci-
sion statement from the minister.  None 
of the education councils at the city/
district level, based on knowledge, has 
been able to function effectively.  None-
theless, as regards the existence of 
school committees, they are running 
smoothly.  
…the minister has not yet decid-
ed on the formation of a national educa-
tion council. Consequently, provincial, 
city/district governments also show re-
luctance to establish education councils 
in their respective jurisdictions.” 
 
Based on the excerpt of the interview 
above, regulation and administration of 
the education council is still territorially 
based.  Such a situation is confirmed by 
the fact that the establishment of the edu-
cation council at the local government and 
national level must be based on decision 
statement issued by the local government 
head and Minister of education, respec-
tively. Thus, the head of the city/district 
government, provincial government, Min-
ister of education and culture, is responsi-
ble for establishing education councils at 
the city/district, province, and national 
level, respectively.  Meanwhile, at the lev-
el of an education institution such as a 
school, the education council takes the 
form of a school committee.  
Independence of schools  
In practice, the role that the school 
committee plays today is somewhat differ-
ent from the role previous school commit-
tee played. This was revealed in an ex-
cerpt of an interview with officials in one 
of the most renowned schools in South 
Jakarta, who noted that: 
 
“…The school committee in the 
past used to assist in mobilizing funding 
(to support school activities) but school 
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committees today are not allowed to do 
so. Previously, the term used for mobi-
lizing funding was support from society.  
Currently, funding for schools comes 
from school operations fund (BOS) from 
the central government and school op-
erational support from the provincial 
government (BOP). Thus, parents mobi-
lizing funding from society is prohibit-
ed.  The implication is that the school 
committee is today limited to observing 
and monitoring the conduct of the 
learning process in schools. Previously, 
the school committee could provide ad-
vice and aspirations toward the policies 
schools made. It is an activity that is no 
longer possible because the committee 
is no longer a source of funding for 
school activities.” 
 
It is thus apparent from the excerpt of 
the interview above that the school com-
mittee today is essentially functionless.  
Having no role to play in mobilizing 
funding, coupled with the dominance of 
government funding for school activities, 
the school committee has been relegated 
on the sidelines of school activities. Edu-
cation expenditure which is based on ear-
marks or levels has made the school com-
mittee and the school unable to undertake 
any activity that does not fall into the ap-
proved school budget.    The above condi-
tion has put the school at a crossroad be-
tween accommodating interests of pupils 
and students and needs of the school that 
are funded through expenditure ceiling 
levels. Most of the budgeting that is con-
tained in a given budgeting ceiling 
(maximum level), by and large covers 
academic activities, while nonacademic 
activities most of which cannot be gauged 
in line with the needs of the school and 
tend to differ from one school to the other 
are financed through general funding. The 
above situation is compounded by the 
condition and responsibility of the central 
government to ensure the successful im-
plementation of the 9- year   universal 
free education. An official who was one 
of the key informants in the South Jakarta 
education office had the following to say 
about the state of school committee and 
school funding sources: 
 
“…today parents are not al-
lowed to make any contribution to the 
school, because the DKI Jakarta gov-
ernment meets all the funding require-
ments for the school.  Thus, the only 
role the parent plays is to take their 
children to school. Moreover, the policy 
is also supported by the central govern-
ment which allocates 20 percent of the 
annual budget to education.“ 
 
Based on the excerpt of the interview 
above, one of the major weaknesses in the 
devolution of education provision to local 
government is the uniformity of programs 
in schools that have different needs.  The 
implication of that can be the deterioration 
in the performance of schools and con-
straints in making use of the education 
funding allocated due to the fact that not 
all school needs are accommodated in the 
budget allocations.  
Devolution in the Education manage-
ment  
Despite the fact that the government 
has implemented the use of cluster system 
in school management at local govern-
ment level, there are still many areas 
where education management continues to 
follow the designated area or zone system.  
As an example, DKI Jakarta province 
which an autonomous region, uses a zone 
or region based model by eliminating the 
status of high competitive edge which has 
been associated and attached to some 
schools.  This transpired in an interview 
which the author of the study conducted 
with teachers in one of the schools in Ja-
karta. The excerpt of the interview was as 
follows: 
 
“…currently there are no longer 
schools that are categorized as favorite 
or considered to have a competitive 
edge over others. That means that all 
schools have the same status. Nonethe-
less, there is little doubt in the people’s 
mind they know which schools are con-
sidered favorite and those that do not 
have such a label”. 
“…Currently, local governments 
have implemented the quota system in 
enrolling new students.  Many students 
whose parents reside outside Jakarta, 
from city outskirts such as Depok and 
Tangerang.  The composition of stu-
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dents is 5% on the basis of  academic 
performance, 55%  local residents 
(Mampang, Pancoran, Pasar Minggu, 
Jagakarsa sub districts), 5% outside  
DKI Jakarta,  and 35%  general (from 
within  DKI Jakarta)”. 
 
In relation to the zone or area based 
policy  above,   DKI Jakarta government 
implemented a new policy in 2016 
through decision statement of the head of 
education office, DKI Jakarta province 
No.184 / 2016 concerning the designation 
of school zones within the framework of 
implementing the  new policy on enrol-
ling new students for the 2016/2017 aca-
demic year.  The new policy is different 
from the previous one in that 45% of new 
students are local and 15% are students 
who are not residents of DKI Jakarta. 
Meanwhile, according to officials in the 
Ministry of education and culture, the 
cluster system tantamount to   condoning 
discrimination against students to enroll 
in good schools.  Another perspective on 
the issue of cluster system in the manage-
ment of education came to light in an in-
terview with officials in the education of-
fice in one of the district governments in 
South Sulawesi.  The excerpt of the inter-
view went as follows: 
 
“The master cluster system as an 
interesting point in attracting new stu-
dents as well as an opportunity to in-
crease the amount of funds obtained 
within the framework of school opera-
tions fund (BOS) in the following year, 
is based on the assumption that the 
larger the number of students that are 
enrolled in the school the larger the 
amount of funds in the form of school 
operations funds a school will receive. 
The fund is used in financing school 
operations. The fund proves helpful in 
financing the addition of new classes, 
where there is shortage, making it ex-
tremely important for the school.”  
 
It is thus apparent that using the cluster 
model in the management of schools will 
widen disparity in both quality and physi-
cal facilities. On  one hand,  schools that 
are cluster I have many students and good  
facilities, while on the other hand, schools 
in clusters III-IV do not have enough stu-
dents, which by extension means that they 
have poor physical facilities.   An official 
in the Ministry of Education and Culture 
confirmed the likelihood of the problem. 
It is because of the need to avert the prob-
lem that led the Ministry of Education 
and Culture to develop and implement 
2013 curriculum which is tailored toward 
fostering and encouraging quality assur-
ance in every school.  In addition, the of-
ficial reiterated that: 
 
“The emphasis of the Ministry of 
education is on quality insurance.  The 
starting point of it all is quality control. 
Since Mr. Muhammad Nuh  became the 
Minister of Education, and introduced 
2013 curriculum (K-13) as the starting 
point of an education regime that puts  
quality insurance at the front and center 
of education delivery. Facilities follow 
school quality assurance. This means 
that quality assurance is   the bench-
mark that every school is required to 
achieve in order to guarantee quality 
education, which influences the facili-
ties the school gets.  The K-13 uses a 
competence standard and standard con-
tents, which every school graduate is 
required to complete and fulfill. Such 
standards have implications for the 
quality of teachers and facilities that 
schools are expected to have in place.  
The implementation of K-13 is gradual 
and phased starting with schools whose 
students have attained national mini-
mum standard of 6.35. In addition, 
schools that quality for adopting K-13 
curriculum must meet another require-
ment, which is that 70% of the teachers 
must be certified.” 
 
Based on the excerpt of the interview 
above, it becomes evident that the Minis-
try of education and culture implemented 
K-13 in a phased and gradual way in order 
to narrow the gap in school quality, which 
has emerged in the aftermath of the imple-
mentation of the decentralization of edu-
cation to local governments.  
c. Free trade administration 
The authority vested in BP. Batam to 
conduct many functions in its jurisdiction 
bred new problems when Batam city ad-
ministration was formed under Law No.  
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53 / 1999.  Based on our observations, 
factors that are responsible for the non-
adoption of functional decentralization in 
the realm of free trade administration in-
clude the following:  
Batam government institutional frame-
work  
The democracy and regional autonomy 
spirit that are based on  Laws the central 
government and  local governments  is 
juxtaposed with laws on free trade and 
free harbors/ports. Batam city govern-
ment, as an autonomous region, has been 
directly impacted by the status of BP. Ba-
tam which is tasked with conducting many 
functions (multipurpose). Such impact has 
been manifested in the inability of the city 
administration to conduct its functions in 
accordance with its status as a decentral-
ized administration. BP.Batam practically 
conducts all functions that are the jurisdic-
tion of Batam city administration.  Batam 
administration city deputy,   confirmed 
such fears in an interview, the excerpt of 
which is reproduced below: 
 
“…we are unable to move swiftly 
in delivering public services simply be-
cause the function of Batam city gov-
ernment is essentially limited to issuing 
citizenship identity cards and family 
cards. This is a direct consequence of 
the fact that all the functions that would 
have been under the ambit of Batam city 
administration are today under the con-
trol and direction of BP .Batam. I have 
one good example.  A few days Batam 
city administration brought to support 
construction activities in the city but as 
I speak today which is eight days since 
the cargo reached the docks, it still has 
been cleared by BP. Batam authority.  . 
…son, just imagine as a conse-
quence of the fact that most of the func-
tions that are usually under the aegis of 
regional autonomy governments are 
today vested in BP. Batam authority,  
revenues that  Batam city administra-
tion from BP. Batam is a mere IDR 800 
Billion and IDR 600 Billion from selling 
land.  As regards selling land, even the 
head of the hamlet is able to do that.  
What that means is that the organiza-
tion that we consider as ‘our big broth-
er’ has yet to manage the authority that 
vested in it effectively.” 
 
On the contrary,   an informant from 
BP. Batam clarified that the existence of 
BP. Batam and Batam city government 
will help in accelerating development and 
service delivery in Batam city. Specifical-
ly, excerpt of BP. Batam are reproduced 
below: 
 
“…see it this way, in the past in 
accordance with the mandate that is en-
shrined in Law of local governments, it 
calls for issuing of a government regula-
tion that hammers out the relations be-
tween the city administration and BP. 
Batam agency. Regrettably, the govern-
ment regulation has not been enacted.  
Consequently many people consider Ba-
tam to be administered and directed by 
two Captains.   In reality, however, Ba-
tam is on island that is running on two 
engines, one engine is BP. Batam and 
the other is Batam city government. The 
hope is that equipped with two engines, 
Batam Island will run even faster than 
other regions in achieving its develop-
ment goals.  That is our hope.” 
 
Based on the excerpt of the interview 
with the BP.Btam official, there are some 
key issues that are important to note.  
Based on BP. Batam officials, Batam Is-
land can achieve faster development be-
cause it is running on two engines. To 
achieve such a feat, the two engines must 
have the same institutional characteristics 
such as authority, organizational structure, 
autonomy space, and financing.  Implicit 
in the remarks is that BP. Batam perceives 
the organizational structure of their organ-
ization to be similar to Batam city govern-
ment.   This is unlikely to be the case giv-
en the reality that BP. Batam was estab-
lished to execute certain functions that 
were delegated to it by the central govern-
ment while Batam city administration like 
other regional autonomy governments is 
tasked to conduct many functions.  In 
short, BP. Batam considers its institutional 
framework to be similar to that of a re-
gional autonomy polity. 
With regards to the division of authori-
ty between BP. Batam and Batam city ad-
ministration, is very clear that BP. Batam 
is vested with more powers (superior) than   
Batam city government. In light of that, 
JKAP (Jurnal Kebijakan dan Administrasi Publik) Vol.21 (1), May 2017 ---- https://journal.ugm.ac.id/jkap 
67 
 
Copyright © 2017, JKAP, ISSN  0852-9213 (Print), ISSN 2477-4693 (Online)   
officials of Batam city administration rec-
ommend the clear division of functions 
between the two institutions.  The follow-
ing is an excerpt of an interview to that 
effect: 
 
“…If it is determined that BP. 
Batam has jurisdiction over  26 points 
that fall under the industrial zone, while 
Batam city government is charged with 
administering  residential areas, then 
the former must limited its authority to 
administering the industrial area and 
the city administration, the non-
industrial part of the Island.  Thus BP. 
Batam must administer only those 26 
points, perhaps by starting with the 8 
points upstream. This is the point that I 
raised while attending a meeting in the 
Ministry charged with economic coordi-
nation in Jakarta. My view is that as 
long as the issue of work relations is not 
delineated clearly, the infighting be-
tween the two institutions will never see 
an end.  The working areas for each 
institution must be clear and well 
streamlined.  That is the main reason 
why during the campaigns we proposed 
abolishing imposing tax on housing. 
Surprisingly, WTO was not reduced, but 
rather raised.  Please be sympathetic to 
us.  
…Imagine, residents are forced 
to pay WTO for residential housing 
while at the same time they are repay-
ing installments on their home mortgag-
es. Real estate developers pay WTO on 
land that is still under contestation and 
disputes. An example is land that cate-
gorized as forest conservation zone, but 
estate developers have already bought 
and paid for such land.  The is more so 
given the subscription that has risen in 
multiples in the order of   148 PMK 
times.” 
 
Based on the except of an in-
terview from Batam city administra-
tion officials in relation to making 
clear  division and distribution of 
functions reflects  the interest of the 
city government to urge the for-
mation of a special economic zone 
that will be administered by BP. Ba-
tam in conducting all its activities.  
 
 
Structure of membership of the region-
al council  
In order to reduce the potential for 
conflicts between the two institutions, the 
Batam free trade and harbor zone council 
was formed. The council is charged with 
the task of mapping the general policies,   
provide guidance, supervision, and coordi-
nation of activities of Batam free trade and 
harbor zone. As BP. Batam is an agency 
that was formed by the government to 
manage and administer certain functions 
in Batam region, the formation of the 
council was based on a presidential in-
struction. It seems that the governor who 
has limited authority that is attached to an 
ex officio as the head of the free trade and 
harbor zone council has its own problems.  
The problems which were disclosed by an 
informant who is a law practitioner in Ba-
tam in an interview with the author that 
went as follows: 
 
“A zone or area that is designat-
ed to become an investment destination 
must have many specialties such as fis-
cal, taxation,  and others, will face ob-
stacles in coordinating with the central 
government given the limited authority 
the governor, as an ex officio member 
of regional council  has. This is espe-
cially so with regards to the authority 
that is not within the purview of the 
head of a regional autonomy admin-
istration.  In other words, the governor 
will face the situation whereby as head 
of the council s(he) has  no power to 
make some of the key decisions that re-
late to activities of the free trade and 
harbor zone on such issues as taxation, 
customs and excise,  operational per-
mits and others  as such authority is 
vested in  ministries and institutions.” 
 
Based on the above advice and inputs, 
it was deemed necessary to form a new 
Batam region council which underpinned 
by Presidential instruction No. 8 / 2016 on 
the Batam region council (DK Batam). 
The instruction above places the Minister 
of Coordination for Economic affairs as 
head of the council (DK Batam).  Mem-
bers of restructured  DK Batam council 
are  Ministry of coordination for economic 
affairs as the  head as well as serving as 
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member  of the council,  and Minister of 
internal affairs, Minister of legal  and Hu-
man rights affairs, Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Trade, Minister of Agrarian 
and Spatial planning, Indonesian armed  
forces commander, Indonesian police 
chief,  Cabinet  secretary,  Governor of 
Riau islands province, Batam city major,  
and head of Riau islands provincial as-
sembly. The new presidential instruction, 
thus, shifted the leadership of the regional 
council from the governor to the Minister 
of coordination for Economic affairs, 
which is expected to shorten the  decision 
making process  that require the involve-
ment of sectoral ministries,  governments 
institutions and non-ministerial  institu-
tions.  
In relation to the composition of Ba-
tam regional council, BP. Batam officials 
expressed their string opposition to any 
efforts to include representatives of the 
business community on the council as a 
pathway to influence decisions it will 
make in future.   This was evident in the 
expression of an official from BP. Batam 
that goes as follows: 
 
“…No there is no indication that 
the policy direction is moving toward 
that way Mister.  We indeed are an 
agency that is managed and adminis-
tered as direct represented of the cen-
tral government.  Thus, we do not have 
direct relation to the local community 
because the agency is not an outcome of 
a directly elected elections by the local 
citizenry.  As for involving members of 
the business community as members of 
the council, it must be noted that the 
council is a regulating agency, making 
it inappropriate for businessmen who 
are regulated to become members as 
well.  We do not know for sure. None-
theless, we can say for certain what the 
future holds. After all, there is nothing 
impossible in Indonesia. 
…there are no indications that 
things are going toward that direction.  
Aspirations of the business community 
are channeled directly to BP. Batam 
through the head or deputy head.  Once 
every 2 months BP. Batam invites inves-
tors, an FGD that involves association 
of Japanese and Singapore investors.  
This is in other words semiprofessional 
mechanism, where BP. Batam proac-
tively invites investors. We have sub 
directorate that conducts evaluation. It 
is that institution that conducts visits to 
businesses to assess the progress of 
their activities. I reckon that companies 
do not want and expect their represent-
atives of the regional council.  Essen-
tially whenever a complaint arises, we 
discuss it together. “  
 
To that end, based on excerpt of the 
interview above, it is apparent that a new 
agency, the regional council, which repre-
sents central government authority at the 
local level is now in place. Nonetheless, 
the contents of the interview also dis-
closed another reality which is that the 
council include representatives of users of 
services it delivers, interalia, investors and 
businessmen. Criticism was also leveled at 
the council one of the informants who was 
interviewed for this study, who noted that 
its constituents make it unlikely to func-
tion as a legislative body that can make 
policies (performing legislative function) 
on issues that relate to free trade and har-
bor that emanate from the public.   
Convening routine meetings on a con-
tinuous basis serves, which is coupled 
with proactively inviting service users, are 
the mechanisms the council uses to tackle 
complaints and conflicts that arise as well 
as deliberate on inputs from users of its 
services. Officials of BP. Batam consider 
such mechanisms are sufficient to tackle 
any problems that arise that relate to the 
functions that fall under their jurisdiction.  
To that end, mechanism the regional coun-
cil uses are starkly different from the Ad-
ministrative Committee model which 
Shanghai FTZ in China has adopted and 
employs. The Administrative Committee 
in Shanghai FTZ representatives of stake-
holders  who are within the jurisdiction of 
the Shanghai FTZ area, hence was not es-
tablished by the central government, in 
which this case, the President of China  
(Tantri, 2013).  Thus, Shanghai FTZ rep-
resentative body represents users of ser-
vices FTZ delivers in addition to repre-
sentatives of relevant Ministries and 
Shanghai city government.  
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Institutional Ambiguity of Bp. Bantam 
in State Administrative Structure  
The management of free trade and free 
harbor zone in accordance to the existing 
regulation is under the control of a non-
structural institution which delivers gen-
eral services.   It is thus an irony that a 
non-structural organization is charged 
with executing functions that that consti-
tute the authority of the President.  In oth-
er words, if BP.Batam is viewed from the 
perspective of state administration in In-
donesia,  is constitutes the fourth authority 
with the same level of authority as com-
missions,, only that  BP. Batam conducts 
tasks that relate to construction of roads, 
hospitals, and other functions that fall un-
der the jurisdiction of the executive arm of 
government. 
 
“…which institution oversees the 
operation of BP. Batam? If it is under 
the central government, it becomes an 
agency that is conducts functions of the 
central government but is located in 
upcountry, which should also means 
there is autonomy. This is because there 
is no single ministry that oversees its 
work and functions.  With respect to the 
structure, BP. Batam is not under the 
oversight of anybody.  This is in contra-
vention of article 17, of the 1945 Indo-
nesian constitution that stipulates that 
the President in conducts his or her du-
ties with the assistance of ministers. 
That is how the logic goes.” 
 
It has been noted that at the outset that 
the establishment of BP. Batam as a spe-
cial institution by the government was 
aimed at conducting specific functions. 
This is in contravention of the current BP. 
Batam functions. Nonetheless, BP. Batam 
officials were not receptive to the sugges-
tion that BP. Batam should focus on con-
ducting FTZ functions, while Batam city 
government handles other functions. Ac-
cording to Batam city government,   BP. 
Batam should be limited to those of its 
predecessor that is Batam authority. This 
was confirmed in an interview with an of-
ficials of Batam city government: 
 
“…actually we were given spe-
cial authority and powers. We would 
like to restore Batam to the status it 
used to have during the time when Ba-
tam achieved phenomenal development.  
That is what we aspire to achieve. What 
is surprising, however, is that the au-
thority we have has been curtailed. 
…the fact that widening the au-
thority and power that is vested in BP. 
Batam is fine as long as such a process 
strengthens and streamlines its authori-
ty. Today, whenever investors come to 
Batam they demand and ask for stabil-
ity, security, and investor friendly poli-
cies. The implication of that is there is 
no longer time for red tape. The reality 
says otherwise. This is because since 
the creation of Batam city government, 
Batam has been managed and adminis-
tered by two institutions that thus vested 
with authority to issue operational per-
mits. The best option is for BP. Batam 
to be charged with the function of issu-
ing operational permits. In other words, 
in future only one institution should 
have the authority to issues operational 
permits. “ 
Based on viewpoints obtained from 
BP. Batam officials, it is apparent that 
they are not open to any possibility of nar-
rowing the authority of BP. Batam to 
managing and administering FTZ related 
functions.  Such a standpoint is contrary to 
opinions which the research team obtained 
from several experts concerning the issue 
of managing a special purpose area that is 
limited to conducting a specific purpose/
single purpose. The need for establishing 
such an agency is very much in line with 
Humes’  statements (Humes, 1959) that  
“The Special-purpose authority is distin-
guished from the special purpose decon-
centrated agencies of the central govern-
ment bureaucratic hierarchy by the fact 
that it is outside this administrative hierar-
chy and has a representative governing 
organ, whose members may be selected in 
one or more following ways”. 
As regards funding the implementation 
of functions that fall under the jurisdiction 
of BP. Batam, officials who are employ-
ees of the institution noted that there are 
two types of funding sources, interalia 
government non tax revenues (PNBP) and 
pure Rupiah”. The sources cited by BP. 
Batam officials are line with those that are 
recommended by the regulatory frame-
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work that underpins the formation of BP. 
Batam. Based on the regulation, funding 
sources for BP. Batam include a) compen-
sation for services BP. Batam delivers to 
the community; b) outcome of collabora-
tion with other parties; c) grants received 
in accordance with prevailing regulatory 
framework; d) Right to manage land; and /
or e) outcome of other economic activi-
ties. Besides, BP. Batam is allowed to re-
ceive other incomes from the national 
budget (APBN) and local government 
budget (APBD). With regards to funding 
sources for BP. Batam, there is an interest-
ing element which is the funding source 
from the local government, which in this 
case is Batam city government. The irony 
is BP. Batam, which has vast authority 
and power, is expected to receive funding 
from Batam city administration, which 
limited authority. 
Apparently, funding from Batam city 
government is in the form of seconded 
funding or funding that the city govern-
ment allocates to BP. Batam to conduct 
activities that relate to public services.  
Doubtless, the above arrangement is stark-
ly different from what obtains in the man-
aging of funding sources in Shanghai 
FTZ. The conduct of Shanghai FTZ activi-
ties makes financial contribution from the 
local government virtually impossible. 
This is indeed the inference that  Guang-
wen (Guangwen, 2003) makes with re-
spect to funding arrangements for Shang-
hai FTZ activities as reproduced  in the 
following excerpt: 
 
“…means that the financial in-
centives and special economic and ad-
ministrative privileges are applied to a 
“zone”, which are not enjoyed by do-
mestic economics, and the national tax 
system, other foreign trade restrictions, 
and some economic and administrative 
policy would not be active within this 
zone; This freedom includes the free 
flow of commodities, capital, service 
and personnel between the zones and 
world economy as well as some admin-
istrative privileges. In other words, the 
zone enjoys economic incentives and 
privileges (preferential policy).” 
 
It is thus evident that the management 
of free trade and free harbor   (BP. Ba-
tam), despite showing potential signs to 
that end, has yet to have the special char-
acteristics that indicate its fully fledged 
orientation toward functional decentraliza-
tion.  With regards to the relations with 
the central government, BP. Batam is still 
very dependent on the former.  This is in-
deed a direct consequence of the nature of 
the organization which is special institu-
tion that the government established and 
conferred a lot of authority to execute the 
management of free trade and free harbor 
activities.  
 
Construction of Decentralization govern-
ance in Irrigation, Education, and Free 
trade sectors in the Decentralization Poli-
cy in Indonesia in future 
Administering and regulating collabo-
ration and cooperation among local govern-
ments as stipulated in the new law on local 
governments is applicable to all government 
functions with the proviso or condition that 
joint management and administration of such 
functions generate externalities across local 
governments and enhance efficiency in pub-
lic service delivery. Regulation on coopera-
tion and collaboration as stipulated in Law 
on local governments divides voluntary and 
obligatory joint collaboration.  Collaboration 
among local governments that share borders 
and those that don’t, but considered to en-
hance effectiveness if consummated are cat-
egorized as voluntary. Meanwhile, collabo-
ration that is based on the need to enhance 
externalities and efficiency in public service 
delivery is considered obligatory.  
To that end, the existence of such reg-
ulatory framework, creates an opportunity 
for collaboration among local governments 
on one hand, and between the central gov-
ernment and local governments on the other 
in the management of government functions 
that are considered to have externalities for 
contiguous and non-contiguous regions un-
derpinned by the goal of fostering   econo-
mies of scale.  
The central government can recentral-
ize a function, and form a board whose 
members are drawn from the central govern-
ment and local government stakeholders.  
This was reflected in results of a research by 
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Muzawardi (Muzwardi, 2015). This was 
what the research referred to as Cross-
Agency’s Partnership Characteristics in In-
vestment Service Delivery which is involve 
collaboration among various stakeholders 
(Figure 1). 
Figure 1 shows the potential for the 
formation of boards to support the manage-
ment and administration of the delivery of 
services Batam free trade zone. Nonetheless, 
the model of collaboration is not representa-
tive of all stakeholders that use the services 
the board delivers such as national chamber 
of commerce and industry (KADIN), associ-
ation of Indonesia businessmen (APINDO) 
and others. Relating the model of collabora-
tion to the concept of Good Governance), a 
board can be likened to a service delivery 
contract between the government and ser-
vice users which   Kumorotomo refers to as 
the  Citizen Charter in service delivery 
(Kumorotomo, 2007). Citizen Charter as a 
contract of delivering services to the public 
in order to enable them fulfill their political 
rights as citizens.  The political contract spe-
cifically for the function of free trade and  
can be incorporated into activities of boards , 
which by extension can be implemented in 
the realm of irrigation and  education admin-
istration within the framework of functional 
decentralization. 
Reconstruction of good governance in 
sectoral decentralization which is the corner-
stone of this research can be achieved due to 
the existence of mechanisms that are condu-
cive for functional decentralization in the 
decentralization policy in Indonesia.  De-
spite the fact the Indonesian constitution 
does not contain provisions on the use of 
other mechanism, the potential for recon-
struction of good governance in decentrali-
zation policy  which is based on the devolu-
tion of  functions  in accordance with territo-
ry can be complemented by other mecha-
nisms.  Such an opinion was confirmed in an 
interview with an expert who was a key in-
formant of this research.  “…in fact decen-
tralization policy In Indonesia is very much 
based on territory or area, which is why 
mechanisms that are used in decentralization 
of functions are limited to decentralization, 
deconcentration, and the lower tier admin-
istration executing functions of the central 
government.  Nonetheless, other mecha-
nisms can be employed in the administration 
and management of functions through the 
issuing relevant laws despite the fact the 
constitution does not have provisions on 
that”. In addition, “essentially, Indonesian 
1945 constitution before amendment was 
flexible to the execution of regional and ad-
ministrative government on the basis of ter-
ritory both larger and small”. 
Ideally, reconstruction of good govern-
ance in Indonesian decentralization in future 
especially in education, irrigation, and free 
trade can be achieved piecemeal.  First, col-
laboration and cooperation mechanism 
among local governments in the manage-
ment of functions that have high externali-
ties   as well as collaboration between local 
governments and the central government, 
after which the central government establish-
es boards that comprise representatives of 
the central government, local governments, 
and stakeholders. Secondly, functions that 
are by nature Trans regional (involve more 
than one local government) such as River 
Cilicis and free trade can directly be man-
agement under the mechanism of functional 
decentralization.   Meanwhile, education ad-
ministration prior to implementing function-
al decentralization, requires equalization 
(reducing disparity in education quality 
across both local governments and schools, 
making good use of the standards that were 
set in 2013 curriculum.  
The renewal, which is referred to 
above, relates to a process that should lead to 
zone based in a gradual manner in a phased 
manner that should not take unnecessary 
long time based on 2013 curriculum as qual-
ity insurance.  Indeed, officials in the minis-
try of education acknowledge that the adop-
tion of K-13 will first of all start with ele-
mentary and junior schools that have 
achieved a minimum of 6.5 in their national 
examination results and 80 percent of their 
teachers are certified.  Subsequently the cur-
riculum will be adopted at higher education 
levels. The policy is trying to reduce the 
wide disparity in schools by eliminating 
schools that have been associated with high 
competitiveness or favorites.  If and when all 
schools have the same quality, the zone 
based system in enrolling new students can 
be implemented.  
The condition in BP. Batam which is a 
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multi-function of multipurpose institution 
viewed from the prism of a local govern-
ment, must be forced to reduce its authority 
in line with initial functions that enshrined in 
its vision, missions, and goals at its incep-
tion. Such a step must be done because Ba-
tam city government duplicates more or less 
the same functions as BP. Batam. Mean-
while, on the issue of irrigation administra-
tion, P3A which is vested with the authority 
to administer and manage tertiary irrigation 
should have more authority that should in-
clude managing secondary and primary irri-
gation as well. This should apply to educa-
tion administration when and if the quality 
of education among schools will be the 
same.  
Maksum explains that the central es-
tablished special local institutions in order to 
manage functions that are trans-regional in 
nature hence can be conducted by a single 
local government (Maksum, 2006). To that 
end, such an institution or agency must be 
supervised and overseen and accountable to 
the President.    As the President faces con-
straints in conducting direct supervision and 
oversight over such institutions or agencies, 
institutions which have representatives of 
stakeholders were formed to do such func-
tion on behalf of the President. Direct users 
of services that are executed by special agen-
cies (farmers and businessmen) have an op-
portunity to monitor directly the perfor-
mance of their representatives as well as em-
ployees of such institutions on the ground.  
Based on the foregoing, this research pro-
poses the following reconstructed model of 
functional decentralization as depicted in 
Figure 2. 
To incorporate the above proposal, the 
central government can make use of the arti-
cle on centralization in the Indonesian basic 
constitution, which is the President holds the 
ultimate responsibility to execute govern-
ment functions. Besides, alternatively, the 
formation of functional decentralization can 
be made on the basis of serving national 
strategic interest.    Such an argument was 
reflected in an interview the author had with 
an expert on administration which went as 
follows: 
 
“Special region or zone is na-
tional interest and is therefore there to 
serve national interest, the interest of 
the unitary republic of Indonesia 
(NKRI) supersedes all others, those of 
local governments, inclusive.  Nonethe-
less, the existence of a special institu-
tion that serves national interest in the 
area that is the jurisdiction of the local 
government must be on condition that 
the latter is well aware of the authority 
that is vested in the institution that 
serves national interests. When the au-
thority of the special region or zone is 
located in the area that is under the ju-
risdiction of the local government, the 
President can retract or withdrawal the 
authority and hand it over to a special 
region or zone.“ 
 
Based on the excerpt of the interview 
above, it become clear that the juxtaposition 
of operational areas for special zones and 
local government, is bound to generate prob-
lems in the implementation of functional de-
centralization   in special zones or regions. 
To that end, there is need to form representa-
tive agencies or bodies that comprise stake-
holder of special zone or region. Figure 3 
depicts the mechanisms that are proposed to 
implement the formation of functional de-
centralization: 
The central government retracted or 
recentralize the authority to administer and 
manage irrigation, education, and free trade 
functions with the purpose of achieving   
economies of scale, national strategic inter-
ests and high externalities. Besides, the In-
donesian constitution mandates that the Pres-
ident is the ultimate authority over adminis-
trative issues in the context of the united re-
public of Indonesia. After that the central 
government can restore or devolve the au-
thority to manage the functions to local 
stakeholders, who subsequently manage 
such using democratic means through the 
formation of representative institutions that 
comprise representatives of the central gov-
ernment, local governments and users in the 
area where the institution is located or oper-
ates. Representatives can be directly elected 
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can be executed in a phased manner by pay-
ing serious attention to collaboration among 
local governments using cooperation mecha-
nisms among local governments, and foster-
ing collaboration between the central gov-
ernment and local governments in adminis-
tering certain functions which form the foun-
dation of boards.  Subsequently, the central 
government forms functional decentraliza-
tion based institution through the retraction 
or withdrawal of the authority to administer 
and manage irrigation, education and free 
trade functions initially, and afterwards de-
volve such authority democratically elected 
local stakeholders. Several factors are re-
sponsible for absence of functional decen-
tralization policy in the administration of 
irrigation, education and free trade functions. 
The main factor, however, is absence in the 
provisions of Indonesian constitutions that 
stipulates on functional decentralization in 
the three functions.  To that end, it is not un-
fathomable that article 18, Indonesian 1945 
constitution should be amended to provide 
the highest normative foundation for func-
tional decentralization.  Nonetheless, consid-
ering the formidable difficulty of amending 
the constitution, another alternative should 
be to amend the existing law on local gov-
ernment. The amendment should allow dem-
ocratically elected local stakeholders to have 
the authority to manage certain functions.   
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